provide an important and stimulating analysis of many data about the hippocampal memory system. As their title suggests, they identify "two functional components" of this system, and are thus part of a fertile tradition that dichotomizes memory functions into two complementary compartments. Dichotomies such as declarative memory /procedural memory, knowing that/knowing how, taxon/loca.le, memory /habit have served their creators well. On the other hand, each of these dichotomies fails to handle large sets of data., if only because they do not deal with key learning problems that animals a.nd humans need to solve.
An alternative approach is to develop neural models of how animals and humans learn to rapidly adapt to changing environmental circumstances in real time. Such real time anaJyses have disclosed concepts and mechanisms that are invisible to descriptive analyses. Real time analyses have hereby suggested how the hippocarnpal system may interact. with several other brain systems, and why it plays multiple roles in recognition memory, attention, cognitiveemotional interactions, adaptive timing, and spatial orientation. Such analyses go beyond the Eichenbaum el a.l. analysis in several respects, and do not support it in some particulars.
One analysis concerns how hurnans and animals rapidly learn to categorize events a.nd their contexts in real time. This analysis shows how processes of recognition learning, categoriza.tion, attention, rnernory search, expectation, and novelty detection work together to realize object recognition. Interactions between inferotempora.l (IT) cortex a.nd hippocmnpa.l formation are particularly emphasized. It is suggested how an attentiona.l subsystem carries out the learning of bottom-up recognition categories and top-clown expectations by interacting with an orienting subsystem that triggers reset and memory search for new or better categories when an input exemplar is too novel to match an active top-down prototype. 1'he attentional subsystem models part of the Where cortical processing stream that includes IT cortex. The orienting subsystem is interpreted to intersect the hippocampal system. Together these systems are called an Adaptive Resonance Theory, or AHT, model. A lesion of the AHT model's orienting subsystern creates a. formal memory disorder much like Not>ember 22, 1993 the medial temporal amnesia that is caused in animals and patient HM after hippocampal system lesion. See Carpenter and Grossberg (1993) for a. recent review and Grossberg (1975 Grossberg ( , 1982 for development of this hypothesis. Properties of the ART model also clarify how, in Eichenbaum et al. 's words, the hippocampal system achieves "flexible expression of memories in novel contexts" and why matching tasks are relevant to hippocampa.l function, such that hippocampal neurons respond differently to match a.nd non-match conditions (Otto and Eichenbaum, 1992; Riches et al., 1991; Sakurai, 1990) . Indeed mismatches within the a.ttentiona.l systern trigger memory searches for better recognition categories by activating the orienting ~ubsystem.
These modelling results do not support the Eichenbaum et al. claim that "representa.tiona.l properties of the hippocampal system comprise the fundamental characteristics of declarative memory" or that the "hippocampal representation ... reflect [s] ... the abstraction of relevant relations arnong ... stirnuli." In fact, no rnernories are stored within an AHT orienting subsystem. Rather, interactions between the orienting and attentional subsystem enable the httter to rapidly and stably lea.rn to categorize new information in a way that is sensitive to environmental relationships. Without the orienting subsystem, these properties are substa.ntially degraded. Carpenter and Grossberg (199:3) suggest experiments to test this prediction. Eichenbaum e/. al. seem themselves to be unclear about this point, since they say "whether the hippocampal system actually stores memories .... remains unclear." Eichenbm)m el al. dichotomize the tempora.l and representational properties of hippocarnpal mernory processing a.s "orthogonal functional properties". They do not, however, say why a. single brain structure should combine these properties, especially if they are "orthogona.l". Real-time neural models distinguish these processes mechanistically, but a.lso show how they ma.y be intimately linked. These results darify how the hippocampal system may mediate tasks like delayed non-match to sample (DNMS) wherein both ternporal delays and novelty-based cornputations are involved.
The larger issues about temporal properties that are treated by the neural models con-cern how cognitive-emotional intera.ctions are coordinated, particularly how classical and instrumental conditioning are cognitively modulated and adaptively timed. The basic conditioning model was introduced in Grossberg (1971 Grossberg ( , 1972a Grossberg ( , 1972b Grossberg ( , 1975 and elaborated steadily thereafter, as in Grossberg (1987 Grossberg ( , 1988 Grossberg (1971 Grossberg ( , 1975 that, the final common path of the drive representations D, at or after the stage at which motivational decisions are made, intersects or is modulated by the hippocampal formation. This prediction has received several types of experimental support. For example, Thornpson et al. (1987) have shown that S -> D "hippocampal" conditioning subserves the conditioned emotional response whereas S --> M "cerebellar" conditioning subserves the discrete adaptive response, and hippocampal abhttion attenuates blocking (Rickert cl a/., 1978; Solomon, 1977) . These properties clarify how "hippocampal system da.mage can result in either impaired or ahnormaJiy strong utili"'ation of contextual 'cues" due to a failure of blocking cornbined with a failure of flexible reset. and memory search to discover appropriate cue combinations for attentive categorical binding.
Why, though, should it be the hippocampal formation rather than another brain region, that rnodulates ernotional conditioning? Neural models s.uggcst that this is due to the way in which adaptive timing is linked to conditioning, motivated attention, and orienting responses Merrill, 1992, Grossberg and Schmajuk, 1989) . In particular, S --> D _, S feedback can rapidly draw attention to motivationally salient cues, at the same time tlutt inhibition from D to the orienting subsystem inhibits maladaptive orienting responses in response to fluctuating situational cues. Another process is, however, needed to 1m1intain attention during the variable delays that are characteristic of task demands. In particular, suppose tha.t an a.nima.l inspects a. food box right a.fter a signal occurs that predicts food delivery in 6 seconds. Why does not the animal interpret the immediate non-occurrence of food a.s a. predictive failure? Why does not the mismatch between the expectation of food and the percept of no-food trigger premature reset of attention, extinction, and exploratory behavior? The model suggests how a "spectral timing" circuit S -> T operates in parallel with the fa.st S _, D emotional conditioning circuit. Lea.med timing within S _, T prolongs the inhibition of the orienting subsystem, and thereby enables attention to be ma.inta.ined on salient goal-related cues within the expected 6 second delay. If food does not occur thereafter, the adaptive timing circuit becomes quid. Subsequent rnismatches do trigger attentional reset, extinction, and exploration. Grossberg and Merrill (1992) predicted that a. spectra.! timing circuit occms in the dent.itte-CA3 circuit in order to explain ma.ny conditioning da.ta. from the labs of 'I'. Berger a.nd R. Thornpson; e.g., Berger el. al. (1986) . Nowak and Berger (1992) ha.ve since reported evidence consistent with the spatially organized spectral representation tha.t we predict.ed to occur a.t dentate cells. If hippocampus is rernoved, then a.nirna.ls and hurnans have problerns with DNMS a.nd related tasks that involve stimulus delays. In the model, a similar thing happens when the 'I' circuit is removed. In addition, as Eichenbaum cl. al. note, "both DNMS perfonnance a.t brief delays and single-pair object discrimination learning with brief intertrial intervals" are spared in· hippocarnpa.l subjects. In the model, this is true because the fa.st S _, D -t S attenl.ional circuit remains intact. Long interstirnulus delays, sa.y of a. da.y, a.lso spare the performance of animals in some conditions (Mishkin el: al., 1984) . These results led Eichenbaum et al. to cla.im that "the hippocampal system subserves a. memory store of intermedia.te duration". These results can be explained by the model without positing any such "memory store". At short delays, the fast feedback S -+ D -> S system helps to focus attention. The failure of blocking at intermediate delays due to the removal of T in the S -> T circuit causes little problern at long delays because potentially competing cues, being so widely separated in time, decay before they can compete.
Why the hippocampal formation should play a. role in spatial orientation is also clarifted within this modelling framework when one goes on to consider how a.n animal ca.n orient its goal-directed behaviors with respect to sets of environmental landmarks that vary in their rnotivational salience. Many groups are now actively working to model this spatial orientation competence. Some properties that need to obtain in a successful model are summarized in Grossberg (1987) .
Taken together, these modelling results clarify the neural mechanisms tha.t ma.y subserve many of the data that Eichenbaum et a/. review, and caution against arguing that modulation of a behavioral process by a. brain region implies that the brain region internally represents the information that is modulated.
